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CHAPTERS 
Closing the international tax gap 
by Joseph Guttentag and Reuven Avi-Yonah1 
In July of 1999, the Justice Department entered into a plea bargain with 
one John M. Mathewson of San Antonio, Texas. Mr. Mathewson was 
accused of money laundering through the Guardian Bank and Trust Co. 
Ltd., a Cayman Islands bank. Mr. Mathewson was chairman and con­
trolling shareholder of Guardian, and in that capacity had access to in­
formation on its depositors. In return for a reduced sentence, Mr. 
Mathewson turned over the names of the persons who had accounts at 
Guardian. The result was an eye-opener: The majority of the accounts 
were beneficially owned by U.S. citizens, and the reason they used a 
Caymans bank had nothing to do with laundering funds earned in crimi­
nal activities. Instead, the accounts were in the Caymans for the pur­
pose of evading federal income taxes on income earned legally, relying 
on the Caymans' lack of an income tax and promise of bank secrecy. 
The IRS ultimately settled 1,165 cases with the individual taxpayers for 
a total collection of $3.2 billion-an average of $1.7 million per tax­
payer (Massey 1999 and Blum 2005). 
Guardian's U.S. clients relied on four simple realities. First, in 
today's world, anyone can open a bank account in the Caymans for 
a minimal fee over the Internet, without leaving the comfort of their 
home. Second, the account can be opened in the name of a Cay­
mans corporation, which can likewise be set up long-distance for 
minimal transaction costs (as evident from any perusal of the back 
pages of The Economist magazine, where law firms advertising such 
services abound). Third, money can be transferred into the account 
electronically from the United States or from abroad, and in most 
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cases there would not be any reporting of such transactions to tax 
authorities. Finally, the funds in the Caymans account can then be 
used for investments in the United States and in other high tax juris­
dictions, and there would generally be no withholding taxes on the 
resulting investment income, no Caymans taxes, and no informa­
tion on the true identity of the holder available to the IRS or any 
other tax authority (Blum 2005). Significantly, other than the use of 
the Caymans, both the underlying funds that were deposited in the 
Guardian accounts, and the investment income, were generally 
purely domestic transactions, and the tax evaded was U.S. income 
tax on U.S. source income beneficially owned by U.S. residents. 
The ability to use the Caymans and other offshore tax havens to 
evade income taxes is a relatively recent phenomenon. Since about 1980 
there has been a dramatic lowering of both legal and technological bar­
riers to the movement of capital, goods, and services. As countries have 
relaxed their tariffs and capital controls, much of the world economy 
has shifted from goods to services, and electronic means of delivering 
services and transferring funds have developed. At the same time, the 
tools used by tax administrations to combat tax evasion have not changed 
significantly: Most tax administrations are limited to enforcing taxes 
within their jurisdiction, and for international transactions, can only rely 
on outdated mechanisms like exchange of information under tax trea­
ties with other high-tax countries, which are unavailing for income earned 
through tax haven corporations. Simply put, we have the technology 
that enables people to conduct their affairs without regard to national 
borders and without transparency, while restricting tax collectors to geo­
graphic borders, that are meaningless in today's world. 
This chapter focuses on the problem of closing the "international 
tax gap," defined as the portion of taxes owed but not collected 
from U.S. taxpayers when an international connection of some type 
hinders the IRS. For example, a U.S. business owner selling goods 
abroad over the Internet can direct her foreign correspondent to 
deposit the sale proceeds in a Swiss bank account. Or a U.S. resi­
dent (like the Guardian depositors) can shift funds to a Caymans 
corporation and the corporation can lend these funds back to the 
United States and earn interest income. In neither case will there be 
withholding or automatic information reporting to the IRS, and as a 
result, it is unlikely that the IRS will be able to collect the tax due. 
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The size of the international tax gap 
The Unites States legitimately boasts one on the world's higher com­
pliance rates for tax collections. However, most of the taxes collected 
by the IRS are from income that is subject either to withholding at the 
source (e.g., wages) or to automatic information reporting to the IRS 
by financial institutions (e.g., interest or dividends from U.S. payors). 
The IRS has recently estimated that in 2001 there was a total "tax gap" 
(i.e., a difference between the taxes it collected and the taxes it should 
have collected under existing law) of between $312 and $353 billion, 
or about 16% of total taxes owed (IRS 2005). A large portion of this 
gap results from income that is subject to neither withholding nor in­
formation reporting, such as most income of small businesses and in­
come earned from foreign payors. For these types of income, the com­
pliance rate falls from over 90% to under 70% (Aaron and Slemrod 
2004). 
No one, including the IRS, has a good estimate of the size of the 
international tax gap. This is not surprising given that the activities 
involved are illegal, but one can make an educated guess based on a few 
publicly available numbers. In 2003, the Boston Consulting Group es­
timated that the total holdings of cash deposits and listed securities by 
high net worth individuals in the world were $38 trillion, and that of 
these, $ 16.2 trillion were held by residents of North America. Out of 
these $ 16.2 trillion, "less than" 10% was held offshore (as compared 
with, for example, 20-30% offshore for Europe and 50-70% offshore 
for Latin America and the Middle East) (Dyer, De Juniac, Holley, and 
Aerni 2004). 
If one translates this estimate into approximately $ 1.5 trillion held 
offshore by U.S. residents, and if one assumes that the amount held 
offshore earns 10% annually, the international component of the tax gap 
would be the tax on $150 billion a year, or about $50 billion. This 
figure is in the mid-range of estimates of the international tax gap in 
2002 by former IRS Commissioner Charles 0. Rossotti ($40 billion) 
and by IRS consultant Jack Blum ($70 billion) (Sullivan 2004). As an 
order of magnitude, an estimate of $50 billion for the total international 
tax gap (for each tax year) appears congruent with the $3.2 billion ac­
tual recovery by the IRS from a single Cayman bank (for multiple tax 
years). 
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This estimate suggests that the international tax gap (i.e., illegal 
tax evasion by mostly individual U.S. taxpayers through cross-bor­
der activities) may be significantly greater than the total corporate 
tax gap, i.e., the underpayment of corporate taxes due to tax shel­
ters, transfer pricing, and other tax avoidance activities, which the 
IRS has estimated at about $29.9 billion for 2001 (IRS 2005). And 
yet, as we will discuss below, the IRS expends far more resources 
on the corporate tax gap than on the international tax gap. 
Why the International tax gap is a problem 
Why should we care about the international tax gap? When the Organi­
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) began its 
crackdown on tax havens in 1998, Dan Mitchell of the Heritage Foun­
dation criticized it as a group of bloated welfare states ganging up as a 
cartel to quash the small, defenseless Caribbean islands that depend on 
offshore banking activities for their livelihood. The tax havens, it was 
argued, are needed to protect the property of residents of non-demo­
cratic countries from confiscation by tyrants. And the availability 
of low-or no-tax offshore centers serves as a salutary check on the 
tendency of rich country governments to increase taxes (Center for 
Freedom and Prosperity 2001). 
However, even thoughtful supporters of tax competition like Julie 
Roin acknowledge that this argument is problematic when it is applied 
to illegal tax evasion by citizens of democratic countries (Roin 2001). 
After all, the desirable size of the public sector in those countries, in­
cluding the United States, is the key political issue of our times, which 
is fought and re-fought every few years at the ballot box. Once the 
citizens have determined by their votes what mix of government pro­
grams they would like to pay for through their taxes, it seems perverse 
to argue that some of them can then legitimately opt out of participation 
in the process by evading the law and stashing their income overseas, 
away from the reach of the tax collector. After all, those citizens do not 
actually move to the offshore tax havens, thereby subjecting themselves 
to a much lower quantity and quality of government services. Instead, 
they stay at home and continue to enjoy the level of services provided 
by the rich country government, but refuse to pay their fair share of the 
cost (for elaboration, see A vi-Yonah 2000). 
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It is important to distinguish such illegal tax evasion activities by 
individual residents of high-tax countries from tax competition.2 Tax 
competition is healthy, for example, where it increases government 
efficiency and the development of sound tax policies that maximize 
economic development while financing necessary government pro­
grams. In this way, tax competition reduces the tax burden. 
None of the steps taken by the OECD, nor the ones proposed 
below, involve forcing the tax havens to collect taxes for OECD mem­
ber countries. Rather, they involve cooperation in exchange for in­
formation, similar to what is already done voluntarily in other con­
texts that require such cooperation (such as the fight against 
international terrorism and drug cartels). Otherwise, all the suggested 
steps can be taken unilaterally by OECD members without discrimi­
nation and without harming the sovereignty of the tax havens. 
The United States is currently facing significant budget deficits 
that are likely to increase as costs of entitlement programs go up. 
These deficits are increasing daily as a result of the ongoing "war 
on terror" and natural disasters like Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Closing the tax gap by better enforcing current law is one deficit 
cutting measure on which Republicans and Democrats may be able 
to agree (see, e.g., Committee for Economic Development (2005), 
a bipartisan group). If the United States could collect an additional 
$300 billion per year (the total estimated tax gap), this would go a 
long way to reduce the deficit; and even a significantly lower num­
ber (presumably there will always be a tax gap) would be helpful 
under current conditions. 
Closing or reducing the tax gap would have an effect beyond the 
revenue involved. A large part of the current unpopularity of the in­
come tax has resulted from the perception that "only the little people 
pay taxes." If the United States can improve its collections from the 
rich, everyone will feel better about paying their fair share. This would 
ease some of the pressure from the income tax and enable a debate about 
replacing it with another kind of tax in a less acrimonious atmosphere. 
Taxpayers should not be forced to adopt a different kind of tax system 
because of the unwillingness (not inability) to enforce existing law, nor 
should taxpayers decide for themselves how much tax they would like 
to pay by using the loopholes in existing law to their benefit (Com­
mittee for Economic Development 2005). 
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Solutions to the international tax gap 
Following are five steps that can be taken on a bipartisan basis to help 
close the international tax gap: 
1. Increased IRS enforcement 
It is well known that the IRS has in recent years faced an increased 
workload with diminished resources. From 1992 to 2001, the IRS 
"full-time equivalent" staff decreased by about 20,000 positions. 
This trend has been reversed more recently, but as former IRS Com­
missioner Rossotti has written, the increase is not enough to keep 
up with the increase in complexity of the tax system and the size of 
the economy (Rossotti 2004). In recent years, Congress has repeat­
edly increased the complexity of U.S. tax law without adding fund­
ing to the IRS. Bipartisan groups like the Committee for Economic 
Development (CED) have recently called for more resources and 
political support to be given to the IRS (CED 2005). 
Decreased resources have forced the IRS to focus its attention on 
certain areas and neglect others, and predictably, the areas receiving the 
most attention have been those in the political limelight, such as the 
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) (under pressure from Republicans) 
and corporate tax shelters (under pressure from Democrats). However, 
these are not necessarily the areas likely to generate the most "bang for 
the buck" in terms of closing the tax gap. EITC fraud involves small 
amounts, and corporate tax shelters are very difficult to audit and have 
frequently been upheld by courts upon review. While the United States 
should continue its effort to combat corporate tax shelters, increased 
international enforcement could be even more efficient in eliminating 
the tax gap. 
The IRS should dedicate more resources to attempting to close the 
international tax gap. In particular, the IRS should give more priority, 
and be given more resources, to audit compliance with existing laws 
requiring U.S. taxpayers to report ownership of foreign bank accounts 
and stock in foreign corporations. Moreover, the IRS should focus on 
auditing businesses relying on e-commerce in overseas transactions, 
which are particularly susceptible to abuse. If the Mathewson case is 
any indication, such increased attention may generate many dollars in 
tax revenue for every dollar spent on enforcement.3 
2. Bilateral information exchange 
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The United States currently has bilateral information exchange agree­
ments with several tax haven jurisdictions. However, most of the exist­
ing agreements are restricted only to criminal matters. Criminal matters 
are a very small part of overall tax collections, and pose very difficult 
evidentiary issues in the international context. Moreover, the agree­
ments sometimes require the subject matter to be criminal in both the 
United States and the tax haven, which would never be the case for pure 
tax evasion. In addition, they typically require the United States to make 
a specific request relating to particular individuals, and they also typi­
cally do not override bank secrecy provisions in tax haven laws. These 
limitations mean that existing tax information exchange agreements, 
while helpful and important in some cases, are of limited value in clos­
ing the overall international tax gap. 
The OECD has recently modified Article 26 (Exchange of Informa­
tion) in its model income tax treaty, and has adopted a model Tax Infor­
mation Exchange Agreement (TIEA), both of which are intended to 
address all of these problems. Under the new Article 26 and model 
TIEA, exchange of information is automatic (rather than just by 
request), relates to civil as well as criminal tax liabilities, does not 
require "dual criminality" or suspicion of a crime other than tax 
evasion, and overrides bank secrecy provisions in domestic laws. 
The United States should renegotiate its existing tax treaties and 
exchange of information agreements to incorporate all the changes 
made by the OECD in its model treaty and TIEA. 
Below is a discussion of the steps needed to induce tax haven juris­
dictions to negotiate such agreements with the United States. For other 
jurisdictions that are not tax havens, the inducement is the information 
they can obtain from the United States on their own residents. To en­
sure such information is available, the Treasury should finalize regula­
tions proposed by the Clinton Administration that require U.S. banks 
and financial institutions to collect information on interest payments 
made to overseas jurisdictions when the interest itself is exempt 
from withholding under the portfolio interest exemption (Blum 
2005). The Treasury has recently proposed to limit such regula­
tions to 16 designated countries, but as Blum writes, there is no 
legitimate privacy or other reason to impose such limitations. The 
banks should collect all the information, and the Treasury should 
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use its existing authority not to exchange it in situations in which it 
might be misused by non-democratic foreign governments (e.g. ,  
when freedom fighters use U.S. bank accounts). 
3. Cooperation with the OECD 
Current Treasury policy, possibly a reflection of broader foreign poli­
cies, is to focus on bilateral agreements to obtain needed information 
exchange cooperation. However, the OECD has been at the forefront of 
persuading tax haven jurisdictions to cooperate with information ex­
change, and is an organization that the United States had traditionally 
played a leading role in and whose work benefits both governments and 
the private sector. The United States should cooperate with the OECD 
and other appropriate international and regional organizations in their 
efforts to improve information exchange and, in particular, to persuade 
the tax havens of the world to enter into bilateral information exchange 
agreements based on the OECD model. The OECD has made signifi­
cant progress since it began focusing on this issue in 1998, but more 
needs to be done, both on persuading laggard jurisdictions to cooperate 
and on increasing the level of information exchange available from co­
operating jurisdictions. 
4. Incentives to tax havens 
The United States should adopt a carrot-and-stick approach to tax ha­
vens in order to provide incentives to cooperate with information ex­
change. In particular, the United States and other donor countries, as 
well as multilateral and regional organizations, should increase aid of a 
type that would enable tax havens to shift their economies from reliance 
on the offshore sector to other sources of income. 
The common perception that the benefits of being a tax haven flow 
primarily to residents of the tax haven is misguided. The financial ben­
efits of tax haven operations, while funding a minimal level of govern­
ment services, often flow primarily to professionals providing banking 
and legal services, many of whom (like Mr. Mathewson) live in rich 
countries, rather than to the often needy residents of the tax havens. 
Thus, with some transitional support, most tax havens would likely see 
the welfare of their own residents improve as they wean themselves 
from dependence on the offshore sector. 
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5. Sanctions on non-cooperating tax havens 
In the case of non-cooperating tax havens, the U.S. Treasury should 
use its existing authority to prospectively deny the benefits of the 
portfolio interest exemption to countries that do not provide ad­
equate exchange of information.4 This step is necessary to prevent 
non-cooperating tax havens from aiding U.S. residents to evade 
U.S. income tax. 
A principal problem of dealing with tax havens is that if even a few 
of them do not cooperate with information exchange, tax evaders are 
likely to shift their funds there from cooperating jurisdictions, thereby 
rewarding the non-cooperating ones and deterring others from coopera­
tion. Thus, some jurisdictions have advertised their refusal to cooperate 
with the OECD efforts. 
However, if the political will existed, the tax haven problem could 
easily be resolved by the rich countries through their own action. The 
key observation here is that funds cannot remain in tax havens and be 
productive; they must be reinvested into the rich and stable economies 
of the world (which is why some laundered funds that need to remain 
in the havens earn a negative interest rate). If the rich countries could 
agree, they could eliminate the tax havens' harmful activities over­
night by, for example, refusing to allow deductions for payments to 
designated non-cooperating tax havens or restricting the ability of fi­
nancial institutions to provide services with respect to tax haven op­
erations. 
The financial services industry will no doubt lobby hard against 
such a step on the grounds that it will induce investors to shift funds to 
another OECD member country. However, the European Union and 
Japan have both committed to taxing their residents on foreign-source 
interest income. The EU Savings Directive, in particular, requires all 
EU members to cooperate in exchange of information or impose a 
withholding tax on interest paid to EU residents (EU 2003). Both the 
EU and Japan would like to extend this treatment to income from the 
United States. Thus, this would seem an appropriate moment to coop­
erate with other OECD member countries by imposing a withholding 
tax on payments to tax havens that cannot be induced to cooperate in 
exchange of information, without triggering a flow of capital out 
of the United States. 
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Conclusion 
The international tax gap is a significant component of the overall tax 
gap and may in fact be larger than some components that have attracted 
more public and IRS attention, like corporate tax shelters or EITC fraud. 
In order to maintain any kind of tax system, the U.S. public needs to be 
confident that current law can be enforced and that tax evasion will be 
caught and prosecuted. Bipartisan support is needed for taking the steps 
identified above to close the international tax gap. These steps offer the 
potential of raising additional revenue without raising taxes, and of lev­
eling the playing field between ordinary Americans who pay their fair 
share of taxes and others who do not. 
Endnotes 
Closing the international tax gap 109 
1. We would like to thank Henry Aaron, Max Sawicky, Eric Toder, and Philip West 
for their extremely valuable comments on earlier versions of this chapter. Any remaining 
errors are our responsibility. 
2. Tax competition is the use by governments (localities, states, or nations) of preferential 
tax treatment-reduced rates or some sort of deduction, credit, or exclusion-to attract 
taxable activity to their jurisdictions. 
3. For example, transfers by U.S. banks to foreign banks, such as occurred in the 
Mathewson case, generate bank records which can be audited by the IRS. Similar records 
may not exist for transfers from foreign banks or non-bank networks (e.g., the hawala 
trust-based network). T hese types of transfers are also used by terrorists and it would be 
advisable to use the well-developed expertise of the IRS to combat both tax evasion and 
terrorist financing activities. 
Similarly, more use can be made of credit card records and other data mining 
techniques to establish which U.S. taxpayers have foreign accounts that they have not 
disclosed (as required by current law) on their tax return. 
4. See Internal Revenue Code section 87l(h)(6). 
References 
Aaron, Henry J. and Joel Slemrod (eds.). 2004. The Crisis in Tax Administration. 
Washington, D.C.: T he Brookings Institution. 
A vi-Yonah, Reuven S. 2000. Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the 
Welfare State. Cambridge: Harvard. Law Review. Vol. 103. 
Blum, Cynthia. 2005. Sharing bank peposit information with other countries: Should tax 
compliance or privacy claims prevail. Florida. Tax Review. Vol. 6. p. 579. 
Dyer, Andrew, Christian De Juniac, Bruce M. Holley, and V ictor Aerni. 2004. The Rich 
Return to Richer Returns: Global Wealth 2004. Boston: Boston Consulting Group. 
November. http://www.bcg.com/publications/files/GW _short_Nov _04.pdf. 
Center for Freedom and Prosperity. 2001. CFP declares victory, but says fight against 
OECD initiative is far from over. Tax Notes Text . pp. 95-35. 
Committee for Economic Development. 2005. A New Tax Framework: A Blueprint for 
Averting a Fisc al Crisis. Washington, D.C.: CEO. 
European Union. 2003. Directive 2003/48/EC on Taxation of Savings. 
Internal Revenue Service. 2005. The Tax Gap . http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/ 
tax_gap _facts-figures. pdf 
Massey, Boyd.1999. Convicted bank chairman is key to dozens of new tax haven cases. 
Tax Notes Text. pp.171-2. 
110 Bridging the Tax Gap 
Merrill Lynch. 2004. World Wealth Report. www.ml.com/media/18252.pdf. 
Roin, Julie. 2001. Competition and evasion: Another perspective on international compe­
tition. Georgetown Law Review. Vol. 80, No. 543. 
Rossotti, Charles 0. 2004. Letter to Senators Charles Grassley and Max Baucus. March 
22. 
Sullivan, Martin A. 2004. U.S. citizens hide hundreds of billions in Cayman accounts. 
Tax Notes. Vol. 103, p. 956. 
